The Anniversary of Saddam's Troops Entering Erbil in 1996: A Big Picture Perspective on Why Barzani Invited Saddam?
The Kurdish region is today preoccupied with the anniversary of August 31st, or 31y Ab, which marks the day Masoud Barzani invited Saddam Hussein's troops into Erbil amidst the civil war and power struggle with the PUK. The troops' symbolic entry into the Kurdistan Parliament was a watershed moment in the region's history, representing the first time Saddam's forces had entered Erbil since their expulsion by the US-led coalition. This coalition had previously imposed a no-fly zone and pushed Saddam's troops back to the 36th parallel. In response, the US launched "Operation Desert Strike," firing 27 cruise missiles at selected targets near Al-Kut, Al-Iskandariyah, An Nasiriyah, and Tallil. Intriguingly, while Barzani invited Saddam, the US ostensibly attacked Saddam's army for violating a UN resolution prohibiting "the repression of Iraq's ethnic minorities." This incident serves as a potent reminder of the US's decisive role in creating the Kurdistan Region and how the region symbolized the new liberal order characterized by interventionist 'humanitarian' foreign policy.
What's particularly striking is how Barzani was willing to jeopardize the very entity the US had created by inviting Saddam's army. However, as we've argued in an earlier biography of Masoud Barzani, his primary concern has always been his family's survival. He understood the negative optics and that this act would be recorded in history as the last time Saddam entered Erbil. Yet, he also knew that if he could control the region and its resources, he could rule for decades and eventually win over many who might have initially called him a 'traitor.' From a realist perspective, his reasoning was sound, and we see today that he's reaping the benefits of this decision.
While the KDP argues that they invited Saddam because the PUK had sought Iran's help, this argument is weak for several reasons: Iranian support for the PUK was less direct, involved fewer actual troops but more of an advisory role, and cooperation with Iran was far less taboo, given that the KDP itself was more or less an Iranian proxy from the 1970s to 1995. In fact, the entire Barzani family had been living in Iran. Interestingly, this line of argument mirrored Saddam's. In fact, a headline from one of Saddam's primary propaganda newspapers (as evidenced in the attached image) proclaimed that they had "cleared Erbil of Iran's agents." This parallel in messaging highlights how both Barzani and Saddam framed their actions as countering Iranian influence, despite the complex realities on the ground. The truth is that during the civil war, the PUK was a more formidable force, enjoyed greater popularity in Erbil, and had more ideologically motivated fighters. Consequently, Barzani had to find a solution, which led to inviting Saddam's army.
It was well-established that Barzani had been cooperating with Saddam well before 1996, so this move didn't surprise those well-versed in the region's history. For instance, Robert Baer, who led a team of CIA operatives based in Erbil, noted in his book "See No Evil" that Barzani consistently disappeared when they planned operations against Saddam's army in Kirkuk or elsewhere beyond the 36th parallel. Moreover, Barzani was already collaborating with Iraq to smuggle oil throughout the 1990s, directly contributing to the survival and enrichment of Saddam's regime (as reported by The New York Times in 1998).
This incident offers insight into Barzani's modus operandi: he believes anything is permissible for his family's survival and operates on the principle of "Barzani or we burn the region." While other Kurdish factions, such as the PUK, have also engaged in similarly questionable actions, at the time, the PUK was generally more reactive to the KDP or perhaps they were regionally less connected and had less options in their disposal. Its more pluralistic leadership made it harder for the PUK to make such unpopular decisions. For instance, Talabani couldn't have unilaterally made a deal with Saddam as Barzani did, due to factionalism within the PUK and the fact that a large portion of PUK Peshmerga were under the direct control of other leaders like Kosrat Rasul and Nawshirwan Mustafa.
For Barzani, while this was a bold move, he had a history of direct cooperation with other countries against Kurdish factions, such as with Iran against Iranian Kurdish groups in the 1960s and 1970s, and with Turkey against the PKK in the 1990s. While other Kurdish groups have indeed cooperated with regional countries against rival Kurdish groups, the KDP's actions have often been more explicit and direct. For instance, the KDP openly fought alongside Turkish troops against the PKK in 1997 and invited Turkey to build the Bamarne airbase in Duhok province that same year.
Whether these actions are justifiable is debatable, but this is how Barzani operates. Interestingly, this approach contradicts what Barzani claims for the local audience. Perhaps he genuinely believes he's doing this under the principle of committing “a little evil for the greater good”. However, the problem with this line of thinking is that he equates himself with Kurdistan and believes there should be no Kurdistan without his family.