Kurdistan's Elections: What the Numbers Reveal About Power Shifts?
This week's Kurdistan parliamentary elections have produced results that allow multiple parties to claim success, though the reality is more nuanced. While the KDP, PUK, and the New Generation movement have all seen significant increases in their absolute vote counts compared to the 2021 Iraqi elections, these raw numbers require careful interpretation. The apparent surge in votes – KDP increasing by 229,963 (40%), PUK by 193,425 (90%), and New Generation by 86,136 (42%) – must be contextualized against the stark difference in voter turnout: 70% in the recent election versus 50% in 2021. While the parties understandably emphasize these favorable statistics, they could be seen as a form of data manipulation. This selective use of data is particularly characteristic of Kurdistan's ruling parties, where a culture of self-questioning is largely absent.
At a strategic level, the results represent a measured retreat for the KDP, though not severe enough to prevent them from claiming victory. For the PUK, while the outcome has increased their parliamentary influence, it fell short of expectations given their ambitious campaign, though they too retain sufficient grounds to declare success.
For KDP:
A post by Masrour Barzani's K24 TV highlighted the increase in their absolute vote count in 2024 compared to 2021.
The KDP's position requires detailed examination. Though their seats declined from 45 to 39, their percentage of total seats only marginally decreased from 40.50% to 39%, considering the reduction in parliament size from 111 to 100 seats. This drop below 40% marks an important psychological victory for the non-KDP camp, as the 40% threshold has long been seen as a symbol of the KDP's dominance in Kurdish politics. Their most significant setback came in quota seats, where their control diminished from nine of eleven seats. This shift is particularly significant because previously, at least nine of the eleven quota seats were KDP proxies, and all eleven consistently aligned with the KDP in parliament regardless of the issue. This arrangement had given the KDP significant influence, effectively controlling over 50% (precisely 50.5%) of the entire parliament.
Nevertheless, the KDP finds grounds for optimism amid these changes. They successfully navigated several potential risks, particularly the real fear that the PUK might have arranged pre-designed electoral agreements with Iraqi groups that could have significantly weakened the KDP's position, especially given their growing tensions with Iran. This context explains why the KDP insisted on resetting ties with Tehran before proceeding with elections. This diplomatic reset was marked by Nechirvan's high-level talks in Iran, including meetings with the supreme leader. The subsequent attendance of both Nechirvan and Masrour Barzani at President Raisi's funeral following his helicopter crash further emphasized this diplomatic reconciliation, particularly significant after Iran's devastating ballistic attack on Erbil that had targeted a senior Barzani-backed businessman.
The KDP's position had been weakening versus the PUK across the disputed territories, largely due to the alliances the PUK built with pro-Iran groups such as Babylon and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. The PUK had effectively driven out the KDP from disputed territories, including Kirkuk and Mosul. Therefore, securing 39 seats plus 3 quota seats represents a significant victory for the KDP, especially as this election was overseen by the Iraqi election commission outside KDP's control. This oversight also strengthen the party's position against allegations of fraud involving supposed Syrian and Iranian voters and deceased individuals that allegedly helped the KDP gain 10 extra seats.
However, the KDP's position for cabinet formation has weakened considerably. Unlike in 2018 and 2019, when they entered government formation negotiations with the PUK and Gorran movement from a position of strength (having the legal ability to proceed without them due to their 50+1 majority), they now face a more challenging scenario. The current composition requires at least 9 additional seats to reach the necessary 50+1 majority, a difficult task given that both New Generation (15 seats) and the Islamic Union (7 seats) are unlikely to join the government. The Islamic Union has already formally announced they won't participate. This means the KDP cannot form a government without the PUK - unlike in 2019 when they proceeded with government formation without the PUK, leaving allocated positions vacant until the PUK joined later. This new reality gives the PUK significant leverage in negotiations.
For the PUK:
A post by Bafel Talabani's Channel 8 highlighted the increase in their absolute vote count in 2024 compared to 2021.
The PUK's performance tells an equally complex story. Their increase to 23 regular seats plus two additional quota seats, bringing their total to 25, represents a significant percentage increase from 18.92% to 25%. This achievement gains additional weight considering the party's recent internal challenges, particularly the split with Lahur Sheikh Jangi and the dramatic expulsion of Mala Bakhtiyar, who was essentially the second most senior figure from the PUK's old guard still alive, after Kosrat Rasool. For Bafel Talabani and his brother Qubad, these results consolidate their grip on the PUK, increase their leverage and influence within the party, and humiliate their rival cousin Lahur Sheikh Jangi, whose last hope for regaining influence rested on popular support.
However, the PUK's campaign rhetoric created expectations that weren't fully met. The campaign focused on ambitious promises that many ordinary people interpreted as the PUK aiming to rival KDP's seat count. Bafel Talabani himself set a clear goal in a public interview, stating they would secure 28 seats against KDP's 38, aiming to reduce the gap to ten seats. Their campaign slogan "we will topple them" was widely interpreted as the PUK seeking parity with the KDP, and public perception matters in such contexts.
Nevertheless, the PUK achieved significant strategic gains. They substantially increased their votes in Sulaimani and Halabja, consolidating their grip over their traditional "Green zone" - particularly significant since the formation of Gorran in 2009 had previously weakened the PUK's popular control in this area. Importantly, for the first time, the PUK secured their own Christian and Turkmen quota representation, breaking the KDP's monopoly over minority representation. This achievement has strategic importance, as the PUK will likely use these positions politically - for instance, their Christian MP, officially aligned with Babylon, is expected to focus on Christian land appropriation issues in the KDP zone, potentially challenging KDP's legitimacy as a protector of minorities, especially in the eyes of foreign dignitaries.
In conclusion, while both major parties can legitimately claim certain victories, the results slightly favor the PUK's strategic position, particularly regarding government formation leverage.