A Decade After the Sinjar Massacre: Revisiting - Why Did Sinjar Fall? Who Bears Responsibility?
For many, including the elites, intellectuals, and the Yazidis, the fall of Sinjar remains an enigma. Questions persist: Why did Sinjar fall? Who bears responsibility? Why was there no resistance in the city? Was the conquest of Sinjar by the ISIS a premeditated scenario? These and many other inquiries continue to perplex observers. However, there are untold narratives about this event which this piece will attempt to elucidate below, based on research, conversations with high-ranking politicians, and access to sensitive information. Here is what transpired in Sinjar before ISIS perpetrated the genocide of the Yazidis in August 2014.
In the first week of August 2014, Mosul and Tal Afar had been under ISIS control for over two months. Around 1000 ISIS militants were positioned mere kilometers from Sinjar, northwest of Mosul. In addition to civilians who had taken up arms to defend the city, there were over 11,000-15,000 peshmerga divided among various battalions and divisions. Three individuals held top responsibility in the city. These individuals are Sarbast Bapiri, Said Kestayi, and Shewkat Doski (Kaniki). Bapiri was head of the KDP, Kestayi was head of Asayish, and Doski was commander of Peshmerga forces in Sinjar.
Before ISIS seized Tal Afar, the commander of Iraqi troops, known as the "tiger of Nuri al-Maliki, former Prime Minister of Iraq," deserted the city and reached Sinjar. He "surrendered" himself to Bapiri and Doski in Sinjar. The two Kurdish officials in Sinjar confiscated all weapons and vehicles, including 40 armored military vehicles, hundreds of light and heavy weapons, and other types of military equipment. Subsequently, the Iraqi military commander was transferred to Erbil and from there to Baghdad via Erbil International Airport, along with the Iraqi soldiers who had managed to escape from Tal Afar to Sinjar.
According to intelligence reports, the two Kurdish officials in Sinjar sold the vehicles and weapons to the PKK and YPG who were deployed near the Iraqi and Syrian port of entry, Rabia. Later, the Turkish Government became aware of this and lodged a complaint with KDP President Masoud Barzani. Following the fall of Sinjar, Barzani launched an investigation into these officials who were implicated in smuggling weapons and delivering them to the YPG.
Approximately 48 hours before Sinjar fell to ISIS militants, the Kurdish officials in Sinjar were hesitant and awaiting orders from above. On August 1st, Sarbast Bapiri, the top KDP official in the city, departed for Duhok, but his exit garnered media attention and compelled him to return to Sinjar. Upon his return, many people, especially the Yazidis, attempted to confront him for instilling fear in the city. However, other residents intervened to protect Bapiri, arguing that he did not hold a government title; he was merely the head of the KDP in Sinjar.
Civilians were evacuating the city to Mount Sinjar to seek refuge as ISIS militants approached the city limits. A large contingent of Yazidis gathered at the KDP headquarters, requesting weapons and ammunition to defend the city, but KDP officials refused to arm them. The KDP officials stated that "no one can protect the city as ISIS militants are very well equipped."
As ISIS units drew closer to Sinjar, the KDP official failed to communicate with Peshmerga commanders. They only conferred with the Asayish official. The Peshmerga commanders were awaiting orders from Peshmerga command. The militants reached the city's outskirts, but no decision was made by any party to either defend or abandon the city.
Sarbast Bapiri contacted Fazil Mirani, KDP Political Bureau Secretary, to discuss the situation in Sinjar, but Mirani had no new information. He subsequently called Masrour Barzani, then Chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council, and remained on the line with Barzani for a couple of hours. The Peshmerga commanders were also making phone calls to the leadership, but the situation remained unclear.
Prior to ISIS's advance, there were disputes between KDP officials in Sinjar and some Yazidi tribal leaders in the area, particularly the leaders of Kojo and Tal Banat villages. The disagreements centered on the connections these tribal leaders had with the PUK and Baghdad. The KDP officials informed the KDP leadership about the differences with these tribal leaders, but no attempt was made to mend relations with them.
The strained relations with these tribal leaders and some of the Yazidis became more complicated in the final hours before the fall of Sinjar, especially when these leaders refused to heed the KDP official and decided to remain in their homes. Some of these individuals who had poor relations with the KDP left Mount Sinjar and returned to the city.
Hours before ISIS militants reached Sinjar, some Yazidi leaders in the southern Sinjar villages such as Kojo told the KDP officials that they considered ISIS as Baathists. They stated: "We prefer the Baathists to you because we lived with the Baathists for decades without issue. They are far better than you" per a report by investigative journalist Sarteep Qashqayee.
The disputes with the KDP and the intransigence of some Yazidi leaders led many people to prefer ISIS rule over KDP governance. Later, approximately 110 non-Yazidi tribal leaders, who had pledged allegiance to ISIS, left Sinjar and other areas, causing ISIS to reconsider its decision to tolerate those who surrendered without resistance. Consequently, ISIS lost trust in the locals and perpetrated massacres in both Kojo and Tal Banat villages.
While the disputes between KDP officials and some of the Yazidis persisted, the Peshmerga forces retreated from the city without informing anyone, and no one knew who had given them the order except Said Kestayi.
The KDP officials and some Yazidis were still in the city when Peshmerga forces made their unexpected withdrawal. Once the KDP official learned of the Peshmerga retreat, he left the city with his troops. Subsequently, ISIS militants entered the town and arrested thousands of Yazidis within a few hours. Upon arrival, the fighters killed thousands of people, including children, women, and the elderly, and enslaved young females. Many of the detainees were transferred to Mosul and other cities under ISIL control.
The debate on Sinjar and how the forces abandoned the city without fighting was ongoing in the Kurdistan Region. Under public pressure, a committee was formed to investigate the fall of Sinjar. After Sinjar's fall, Barzani and the Ministry of Peshmerga established a committee to examine the events. The three officials mentioned above might be responsible for smuggling and delivering arms to the PKK and YPG, but the fall of Sinjar was beyond their responsibility.
The fall of Sinjar remains an enigma. Even if the truth is known to some, it is difficult to accept. The three officials remain in shock and still do not understand why they were instructed not to defend the city. According to some information, which is challenging to publish due to the safety of the sources, the three officials question the sanity of the decision-makers who told them to leave the city. The only thing they know is that they believe Sinjar's fall was "exploited" to promote the Kurdish cause and draw international attention to Kurdistan.
One year after the fall of Sinjar, one of the three officials, Sarbast Bapiri, appeared before Masoud Barzani. In an hour-long meeting where Masrour Barzani was present, he told Barzani that he had received an order from Barzani's son, Masrour Barzani, to withdraw from the city, and Masrour Barzani confirmed Bapiri's statements. He presented substantial evidence to support his assertions.
Before the fall of Sinjar, Bapiri had submitted a report to Barzani about the KDP's popularity among the Yazidis. In the report, Bapiri indicated that the Yazidis "do not want to consider themselves as Kurds and they are not willing to join the KDP." Barzani then told Bapiri that he had sent him to Sinjar to change the Yazidis' view of the KDP and Kurdistan.
On August 3, 2014, ISIL conquered Sinjar and killed thousands of Yazidis. Many Yazidis have lost trust in the Kurdistan Region, and the wound may never heal unless those responsible for the fall of Sinjar are prosecuted.