𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐁𝐚𝐟𝐞𝐥 𝐓𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐛𝐚𝐧𝐢-𝐏𝐊𝐊 𝐏𝐮𝐳𝐳𝐥𝐞: 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐖𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐔𝐊 𝐒𝐚𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐆𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐂𝐨𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐏𝐊𝐊 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐃𝐅?
The newly appointed Turkish ambassador to Iraq has held separate meetings with Qubad Talabani and Bahroz Galaye, the former PUK representative to Turkey. Reports suggest that in both meetings, the ambassador conveyed Turkey's willingness to open a new chapter in its relationship with the PUK, provided the latter ends all cooperation with the PKK and SDF.
However, PUK leaders claim that Turkey's proposition is more nuanced, involving requests for intelligence cooperation against the PKK, similar to their arrangement with the KDP.
The PUK's relationship with the PKK and SDF appears to be more complex than initially perceived. Turkey's concerns extend beyond the PKK to include the close cooperation between the PUK and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It's important to note that Turkey claims the PKK and SDF are essentially the same organization, viewing the SDF as the Syrian affiliate of the PKK. Notably, the PUK has played a key role in training an elite anti-terror force for SDF - for example the head of SDF anti-terror force died in a PUK-owned helicopter crash en route from northeast syria to Sulaimani, further complicating its relationship with Turkey.
Jalal Talabani, in a famous speech, once laid out his fierce opposition to the PKK. Therefore, the current ties are likely transnational in nature: Iran might be the glue in the PUK-PKK relationship, while the US could be the facilitator of the deep military cooperation between the PUK and SDF. The late PUK leader Jalal Talabani's famous speech clearly laid out his opposition to the PKK, its practices, and ideology. It's also important to note that at the time, the PUK was embroiled in active clashes against the PKK:
It's unlikely that the PUK genuinely supports the PKK's ideology or, as they claim, Kurdish rights in Turkey. Instead, these ties seem to operate more at a regional level. When Lahur Sheikh Jangi was the PUK co-leader, he spearheaded relations with the PKK, leading many to believe it was a personal affinity. However, Bafel Talabani's continuation of this policy, even after Lahur's ousting from the PUK, suggests a higher-level strategic coordination. Interestingly, Lahur's media outlets, since his removal from the PUK, have become notably less pro-PKK, indicating that the PUK-PKK relationship might be driven by broader strategic considerations.
These considerations potentially involve Iran and Shia militias. The Turkish Defense Minister recently accused Iran of harboring PKK militants fleeing Turkey. Some pro-Turkish government media have even claimed that the PKK acquired anti-drone systems from Iran via the PUK. The PUK's cooperation with these actors appears to yield tangible rewards. For instance, the party has secured the position of Kirkuk governor and gained senior roles in Mosul administration. Furthermore, this cooperation seems to facilitate the PUK's deeper integration into the Iranian regional system. The US is also often involved in PUK and SDF military training programs, adding another layer to this complex situation.
Turkey has imposed sanctions on Sulaimani International Airport, situated in the PUK's stronghold. The Turkish government justifies these sanctions by alleging PUK-PKK collaboration, specifically claiming that the airport serves as a logistical hub for PKK operations.